Wednesday, July 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 27, 2005 Wednesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: FT MARKETS; Pg. 44

LENGTH: 391 words

HEADLINE: No further currency moves, says China GLOBAL OVERVIEW

BYLINE: By DAVE SHELLOCK

BODY:


The renminbi stayed high on the agenda for financial markets yesterday after China damped speculation that the currency would be allowed to appreciate further in the months to come.

In a statement on its website, the People's Bank of China said media reports describing last week's revaluation as an "initial adjustment" were incorrect.

"A revaluation of the renminbi by 2 per cent, effective in the beginning of the exchange rate regime reform, does not in the least imply an initial move that warrants further actions in the future," the PBC said.

The comments helped drive the dollar back up to near its pre-revaluation level against the Japanese yen. The yen is seen as one of the main beneficiaries of the Chinese move because a stronger renminbi would be likely to help other Asian currencies to rise, boosting Japanese competitiveness.

The dollar also moved higher against the euro but pared its advance after the release of unexpectedly weak US consumer confidence data.

The figures contrasted with a stronger-than-forecast survey of German business confidence from the Ifo economic institute.

Other data released yesterday showed a sharp improvement in Italian business confidence this month and a surge in French housing starts in the second quarter.

"Euroland may finally be beginning to emerge from a drawn-out period of weakness," said Gabriel Stein at Lombard Street Research. "This should be good for equities."

But Tom Levinson at ING Financial Markets noted that while the rise in the Ifo index was "encouraging", the measure remained at historically weak levels.

European equities put in a mildly positive performance, with the FTSEurofirst 300 index inching up to a fresh three-year high of 1,170.91.

The mood was helped by strong results from French software group Dassault Systemes and Spanish bank BBVA.

But Wall Street was mixed as the weak confidence data offset mostly positive earnings reports. In afternoon trade, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was flat, while the S&P 500 gaineed 0.3 pe rcent and the Nasdaq Composite rose 0.5 per cent.

Asian stocks also lacked a clear direction, with Tokyo and Hong Kong edging lower, but Jakarta hitting an all-time high and Seoul closing at a fresh 10-year peak.

The oil markets had a quiet session as investors remained wary about today's US inventories figures and the threat of hurricanes.

LOAD-DATE: July 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 27, 2005 Wednesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: STOCK MARKETS & CURRENCIES; Pg. 42

LENGTH: 621 words

HEADLINE: China denies new renminbi move CURRENCY

BYLINE: By STEVE JOHNSON

BODY:


The yen fell once again yesterday as China poured further cold water on expectations of further renminbi appreciation to come.

The People's Bank of China said in a statement that last week's long-awaited 2.1 per cent revaluation of the renminbi was not a "first step", as many observers had concluded.

The new rate of Rmb8.11 to the dollar was an "equilibrium" level for the currency that would not be adjusted in the "foreseeable future", the PBoC added.

This weakened the Japanese yen, the most liquid play on generalised Asian currency strength.

However, many commentators still refused to believe that the renminbi story was done and dusted.

Jeremy Friesen, senior currency strategist at RBC Capital Markets, seized on reports that China's trade surplus will rise from Dollars 32bn in 2004 to Dollars 80bn this year, saying: "A more than doubling of China's external surplus this year will maintain political pressure for further renminbi appreciation, and we expect further concessions before year-end."

Tony Norfield, global head of forex strategy at ABN Amro, also claimed the PBoC's statement would do little to damp expectations. He argued China would find it hard to "sterilise" all its currency intervention - the issue of domestic bonds to mop up liquidity effectively created by printing renminbi to buy dollars. China would also face the renewed ire of US politicians if there was no further appreciation.

The forward market also doubted the PBoC's word, with non-deliverable forward renminbi/dollar contracts softening just a slight fraction to price in a further 4.6 per cent revaluation in the coming 12 months.

Hans Redeker, head of currency strategy at BNP Paribas, said the Shanghai stock exchange would now act as a bellwether of speculative inflows into China.

Mr Redeker is among those believing China will have to allow further renminbi strength if it wants to deter protectionist talk in the US and avoid overheating in its domestic economy.

Yesterday he advised his clients to sell the euro, Swiss franc and Swedish krona and take long positions in the Taiwan and Singapore dollars, yen and South Korean won to profit from this trend.

Nevertheless, the yen fell 0.8 per cent to Y112.29 against the dollar, 0.4 per cent to Y134.82 against the euro and 0.4 per cent to Y195.45 versus sterling.

Chris Towner, consultant at risk manager HIFX, argued that Y112.50 would now prove a resistance level for the dollar, with Japanese exporters keen to sell dollars above this level, given that most exporters have budgeted for an exchange rate nearer Y105.

However, Mr Towner believed Y110, a 50 per cent retracement of the yen's slide since June to last week's low of Y113.75, would provide a resistance level for the currency.

Elsewhere, the dollar ticked higher yesterday, gaining 0.3 per cent to Dollars 1.2 against the euro, 0.3 per cent to Dollars 1.7399 against sterling and 1 per cent to CDollars 1.2299 against the Canadian dollar.

The greenback held in positive territory despite a modest sell-off when the US Conference Board's measure of consumer confidence came in soft, with the index dipping to 103.2 in July, against expectations for a repeat of June's 106.2 reading.

The euro saw little benefit from Germany's IFO index of business sentiment, which rose to a five-month high of 95 in July, from 93.3 in June.

Mitul Kotecha, global head of forex strategy at Calyon, said sentiment was aided by weakness in the euro and the announcement of early German elections, both of which are likely to be temporary factors, he argued.

Sterling firmed a fraction to Pounds 0.6896 against the euro on a better-than-expected CBI manufacturing survey.

The Australian dollar fell 0.8 per cent to Dollars 0.7573 against the greenback.

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LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 27, 2005 Wednesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: LEX COLUMN; Pg. 18

LENGTH: 246 words

HEADLINE: Currency regimes THE LEX COLUMN:

BODY:


Abandoning a peg is challenging. In Latin America and south-east Asia in the 1990s, leaving a fixed exchange rate regime led to recession.

Although China's move to a managed float resembles a dignified stroll rather than a disorderly scamper for the exit, there are still lessons it can draw from the heated academic debate about how best to guarantee a smooth transition.

A study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research suggests that, for governments hoping to protect growth prospects, capital controls can help. More surprisingly, it also finds that many variables that might be expected to be significant in maintaining stability and growth are, in fact, not. For example, policy rectitude in the form of a balanced budget or current account does not make any detectable difference, nor does the concentration of trade with the anchor currency country, nor the level of foreign debt.

While China meets many of the criteria to ensure a smooth transition, it is clear the new regime will put pressure on its management skills. A priority will be to avoid providing a one-way bet for speculators who believe, contrary to the central bank's protestations, that the currency will appreciate further. In effect, this means it will have to intervene more to control the new crawling rate than it did to protect the abandoned peg. Non-deliverable forwards show the renminbi 5 per cent higher against the dollar in a year, demonstrating that, so far, the speculators are unconvinced.

LOAD-DATE: July 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 27, 2005 Wednesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: COMMENT; Pg. 17

LENGTH: 1141 words

HEADLINE: America has little to teach China about a steady economy JOSEPH STIGLITZ

BYLINE: By JOSEPH STIGLITZ

BODY:


As excitement over China's revaluation has died down - including jubilation by some of the speculators, who have at last earned an (albeit modest) return - it is time for a calmer assessment about what it does and does not mean for China, for the US and for the global economy.

There remains considerable uncertainty. Though China has demonstrated a willingness to adjust its exchange rate, we do not know what will follow; will the total adjustment over the next couple of years be 10 per cent or 40 per cent? The speculators, surely, will be betting on more. And as China wisely sterilises these inflows, we can expect a continuing build-up of reserves, with this being used by speculators and their allies as an argument for further revaluation. But China will, hopefully, see through this.

The key question is how the appreciation will affect global imbalances, China's trade surplus and the US trade deficit and what, if any, will be the knock-on effects. America's trade deficit of Dollars 700bn is nine times China's trade surplus. China's economy has been going gangbusters; rapid growth with little inflationary pressure. The revaluation will hardly make a dent. Even larger revaluations are not likely to do much to the global imbalances.

First, we do not know accurately the size of China's surplus because, in an attempt to circumvent exchange controls, there is over-invoicing of exports and under-invoicing of imports - part of speculative flows. The large import content of China's exports, particularly to America, mean that China's competitiveness will be little affected. Economists disagree about whether the import content for exports to America is 70 per cent or 80 per cent but, whatever the number, it means that the effective appreciation was almost certainly under 1 per cent. In the case of a larger revaluation, Chinese companies would probably respond to the loss of competitiveness by cutting margins, reducing further the effect of the revaluation. This revaluation - even if followed by further moderate ones - is likely only to slow the rising tide of China's exports slightly.

But whether this, or a succession of revaluations, eliminates China's trade surplus will have little effect on the more important problem of global trade imbalances, and particularly on the US trade deficit. Much of China's recent gains in textile sales, for instance, after the end of quotas last December, came at the expense of other developing countries. America will once again be buying from them, and so total imports will be little changed.

More fundamentally, the trade deficit equals capital inflows, and capital inflows equal the difference between domestic investment and domestic savings. That is why, normally, when the fiscal deficit goes up (so domestic savings goes down), the trade deficit goes up. Neither President George W. Bush nor John Snow, the US Treasury secretary, has explained how China's revaluation will change these basic equations. Unless domestic investment goes down or domestic savings go up, the trade deficit will persist, unabated. The trade deficit could diminish but if it does, it will not be a pretty picture. Domestic investment, for instance, could go down if we succeed in getting our wish and China's trade surplus disappears; with China no longer using the money from its trade surplus to fund our huge fiscal deficit, medium- and long-term interest rates would rise. The economic downturn, and the decrease in investment, would be compounded if the increase in interest rates pricked the housing bubble.

There is a myth of mutual dependence: China needs to export goods to the US, which needs China's money to finance its deficit. But China could easily make up for the loss of exports to America - and the wellbeing of its citizens could even be improved - if some of the money it lends to the US was diverted to its own development. China has huge investment needs. If its government is going to lend money, why not finance its own development? Why not fund increased consumption at home, rather than that of the richest country in the world, to pay for a tax cut for the richest people in the richest country, or to fight a war which most view as anathema? But the US could not so easily make up for the gap in funding without large increases in interest rates, and these could play havoc with the economy.

There is a second myth: that China would benefit from letting its exchange rate float freely, letting market forces set the price. No market economy has foresworn intervening in the exchange rate. More to the point, no market economy has fore­sworn macroeconomic interventions. Governments intervene regularly in financial markets, for instance, setting interest rates. Some market fundamentalists claim that governments should do none of this. But today, no country and few respectable economists subscribe to these views. The question, then, is what is the best set of interventions in the market? There is a high cost to exchange rate volatility, and countries where governments have intervened judiciously to stabilise their exchange rate have, by and large, done better than those that have not.

Exchange rate risks impose huge costs on companies; it is costly and often impossible to divest themselves of this risk, especially in developing countries. The question of exchange rate management brings up a broader issue: the role of the state in managing the economy. Today, almost everyone recognises that countries can suffer from too little government intervention just as they can suffer from too much. China has been rebalancing and, over the past two decades, markets have become more important, the government less so. But the government still plays a critical role. China's particular blend has served the Chinese well. It is not just that incomes have been rising at an amazing 9 per cent annually,

and that high rates have been sustained for more than two decades, but the fruits of that growth have been widely shared. From 1981 to 2001, 422m Chinese have moved out of (absolute) poverty.

The US economy is growing at a third the pace of China's. Poverty is rising and median household incomes are, in real terms, declining. America's total net savings are much less than China's. China produces far more of the engineers and scientists that are necessary to compete in the global economy than the US, while America is cutting its expenditures on basic research as it increases military spending. Meanwhile, as America's debt continues to balloon, its president wants to make tax cuts for the richest people permanent. With all this in mind, China's leaders may not feel they need to seek advice from the US on how to manage either the exchange rate or the economy.

The writer is University Professor at Columbia University and was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001

LOAD-DATE: July 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - DocumentCopyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)

July 27, 2005 Wednesday
London Edition 1

SECTION: ASIA-PACIFIC; Pg. 6

LENGTH: 528 words

HEADLINE: Beijing seeks to cool renminbi revaluation fever

BYLINE: By ANDREW BALLS and MURE DICKIE

DATELINE: BEIJING and WASHINGTON

BODY:


China's central bank has moved to cool expectations of a further revaluation of the renminbi, insisting that last week's 2.1 per cent increase against the dollar had been calculated to leave the currency at a "reasonable and balanced" level.

In a "solemn declaration" that appeared to reflect worries about possible speculative capital inflows, the People's Bank of China said the revaluation and simultaneous scrapping of the dollar peg were initial moves in reforming its currency regime. "This certainly does not mean that the 2 per cent adjustment of the renminbi is a first step that will be followed by further adjustment," it added.

Many investors and analysts have seen last week's renminbi appreciation, which was much smaller than the US and other trading partners had demanded, as a prelude to a more substantial but gradual revaluation.

Zhou Xiaochuan, People's Bank governor, reinforced such expectations on Saturday with remarks to Chinese state television aimed at explaining the "core content" of the revaluation and rate regime reform.

"We have made an initial adjustment to the exchange rate level of 2 per cent," said Mr Zhou, who is widely believed to have pushed for a greater revaluation.

The central bank insisted that Mr Zhou had meant Thursday's revaluation was only an initial step in reform of the exchange rate regime. It blamed foreign media for "creating misunderstanding", but its attempt to recast Mr Zhou's remarks is likely to fuel talk of discord between the governor and other Chinese leaders about renminbi policy.

The People's Bank statement adds considerable weight to warnings by Chinese academics against assumptions of a more significant renminbi appreciation against the dollar. It will cause concern among US manufacturers who had demanded a Chinese revaluation of up to 40 per cent.

The US Treasury yesterday declined to comment on the central bank's statement, reiterating that the new currency arrangements allowed for a significant appreciation over time.

Tony Fratto, US Treasury spokesman, said: "China's reform puts a mechanism in place that allows for greater flexibility over time, determined by market supply and demand forces. We will be closely monitoring the operational performance of this mechanism."

Before last week's announcement, the US Treasury, in discreet contacts, told Beijing that a revaluation of at least 10 per cent would be needed to prevent protectionist legislation in Congress. But after much financial diplomacy, the US Treasury does not want to engage in a public sparring match with Beijing.

The central bank statement is unlikely to end expectations of further renminbi appreciation. Yesterday in Singapore, one-year non-deliverable dollar forwards - instruments that allow bets on non-freely-convertible currencies - traded at levels implying a rise from its post-revaluation Rmb8.11 to the dollar to Rmb7.735 in a year's time.

On China's central bank-dominated foreign exchange market, the renminbi ended slightly weaker at 8.1099 to the dollar, down from Monday's close of 8.1097. America must put its house in order before lecturing China, Page 17 Lex, Page 18 Currencies, Page 39 www.ft.com/renminbi

LOAD-DATE: July 27, 2005

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document

LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Financial Times (London, England)

July 27, 2005 Wednesday
Asia Edition 1

SECTION: FRONT PAGE - FIRST SECTION; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 540 words

HEADLINE: Beijing cools renminbi hopes

BYLINE: By ANDREW BALLS and MURE DICKIE

DATELINE: BEIJING and WASHINGTON

BODY:


* People's Bank says further revaluations unlikely

* Action part of currency regime reform

* Hints of disagreement over policy

China's central bank has moved to cool expectations of a further revaluation of the renminbi, insisting that last week's 2.1 per cent increase against the dollar had been calculated to leave the currency at a "reasonable and balanced" level.

In a "solemn declaration" that appeared to reflect worries about possible speculative capital inflows, the People's Bank of China said the revaluation and simultaneous scrapping of the dollar peg were initial moves in reforming its currency regime.

It said: "This certainly does not mean that the 2 per cent adjustment of the renminbi is a first step that will be followed by further adjustment."

Many investors and analysts have seen last week's renminbi appreciation, which was much smaller than the US and other trading partners had demanded, as a mere prelude to a more substantial but gradual revaluation.

Zhou Xiaochuan, People's Bank governor, reinforced such expectations on Saturday with remarks to Chinese state television aimed at explaining the "core content" of the revaluation and rate regime reform.

"We have made an initial adjustment to the exchange rate level of 2 per cent," said Mr Zhou, who is widely believed to have pushed for a greater revaluation than was unveiled last week.

However, the central bank insisted that Mr Zhou had meant Thursday's revaluation was only an initial step in reform of the exchange rate regime.

The bank blamed foreign media for "creating misunderstanding" on the issue, but its belated attempt to recast Mr Zhou's remarks is likely to fuel talk of disagreement between the governor and other Chinese leaders about renminbi policy.

The People's Bank statement will cause concern among US manufacturers who have demanded a Chinese revaluation of up to 40 per cent.

The US Treasury yesterday declined to comment on the central bank's statement, sticking to its line that the new currency arrangements allowed for a significant appreciation over time.

Tony Fratto, Treasury spokesman, said: "China's reform puts a mechanism in place that allows for greater flexibility over time, determined by market supply and demand forces. We will be closely monitoring the operational performance of this mechanism."

Before last week's announcement, the Treasury, in private contacts, told Beijing that a revaluation of at least 10 per cent would be needed to prevent protectionist legislation in Congress.

But after much financial diplomacy the Treasury does not now want to engage in a public sparring match with Beijing.

The central bank statement is unlikely to end expectations of further renminbi appreciation. In Singapore yesterday, one-year non-deliverable dollar forwards - instruments that allow bets on non-freely-convertible currencies - traded at levels implying a rise from its post-revaluation Rmb8.11 to the dollar to Rmb7.735 in a year's time.

On China's central bank-dominated foreign exchange market, the renminbi ended slightly weaker at 8.1099 to the dollar, down from Monday's close of 8.1097. Staying with the greenback, Page 2 US must put its house in order, Page 13 Lex, Page 14 Currencies, Page 26 Background: www.ft.com/renminbi

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????????????人民币升值背後的曲折故事

(美国)华尔街日报 (2005-07-27)

  上周四早间﹐几家主要外资银行接到通知﹐要求他们派代表到中国人民银行(People's Bank of China﹐即中国央行)开会。

  会议是在下午3:30左右开始的﹐这也是中国外汇市场每天的收盘时间。当央行一位官员开始讲话时﹐会议室的大门被关闭并锁了起来。据一位後来获知会议情况的银行界人士说﹐随後央行官员开始谈论一些有点无关紧要的话题﹐然後﹐会议工作人员开始收取与会人员的手机和BlackBerry掌上电脑﹐接着开始分发有4个要点的声明。声明称﹐中国政府决定放弃人民币钉住美元的汇率制度﹐即刻开始生效。

  这些银行人士随後被告知﹐他们必须静候正式声明在官方电视台当晚7点的黄金档新闻节目中播出後才能自由活动。这种在最後一刻作出出人意料之举并采取严格保密措施的做法与长时间来围绕人民币的所有表现倒是非常一致。这的确是一段充满曲折的传奇故事﹐在此过程中﹐美国特使曾多次秘密访华﹔中国有关部门就升值幅度一直存在争议﹔在一次海滨会议中﹐美国经济学家在一群中国高层官员面前争论升值是否有必要。

  据知情人士说﹐早在2003年中国新一代领导人执政伊始﹐中国就开始考虑人民币升值的问题了。以胡锦涛和温家宝为首的这一代领导人更年轻﹐也更具开放意识。而人民币汇率改革最积极的推动者是中国人民银行新任行长﹑能讲一口流利英语的学者型领导人周小川。外国银行界人士认为﹐周是新一代中国高层官员中对全球经济和市场经济的错综复杂最具洞察力的一位。在出任中国人民银行行长之前﹐周小川曾担任了近两年的中国证监会主席﹐在此任上﹐他以作风严厉而闻名。

  华盛顿国际经济研究所(Institute for International Economics)的戈德斯坦因(Morris Goldstein)等支持人民币汇率改革的人士认为﹐有越来越多的国家转向了灵活的外汇制度﹐中国将人民币汇率与美元挂钩的做法不仅导致中国金融体制落後不前﹐而且扭曲了中国的货币政策。而曾获诺贝尔奖的哥伦比亚大学教授蒙代尔(Robert Mundell)等反对人民币升值的人士则担心﹐人民币改革会给中国蓬勃兴旺的出口业带来负面影响。一些人对美国人对中国外汇制度横加指责甚为不满。

  一位了解有关人民币争议情况的中国官员说﹐人们不禁反问﹐“为什麽我们必须听从美国人说的话呢﹖”不过﹐中国领导人中间对是否改革也存在类似的争议﹐他们的观点通过各部委下设的研究机构以及国内财经媒体而显着见於报端。

  2003年春﹐中国人民银行对人民币钉住美元制度以及是否应放弃这种制度加大了研究力度。它为内部员工组织了有关外汇汇率和宏观基金管理的研讨会﹐并从美国大学和投资银行界邀请一流经济学家到北京发表演讲﹐阐述他们在这些问题上的观点。据参加过这些讲座的人士说﹐中央领导人希望尽可能多地听取各种不同意见﹐包括那些赞成和反对汇率改革的意见。人民银行还派员到香港金管局(Hong Kong Monetary Authority)和美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)参加培训。

  获悉央行内部的这些动作之後﹐香港和中国大陆投行银行界的经济学家们开始私下里猜测﹐中国将放弃人民币钉住美元的机制。金融市场就此拉开了一场针对人民币是否会升值的猜谜游戏。

  与此同时﹐随着美中贸易逆差不断扩大﹐美国政界针对中国的批评声也日甚一日。而在1998年的时候﹐美国还对中国在1997年的亚洲金融危机期间坚持让人民币钉住美元大加赞赏。时至今日﹐美国和许多欧洲国家却指责人民币汇率偏低﹐让中国商品在海外市场享受了不公正的价格优势。为解决这个问题﹐美国财政部长斯诺(John Snow) 2003年9月初曾到北京会晤了刚刚出任行长的周小川和财政部长金人庆。当时﹐中国就作出了日後被多次重复的表态﹕中国有朝一日可能会采取更灵活的汇率制度﹐但中国不会慑於美国的压力而采取行动。

  斯诺在2004年曾三次会晤金人庆﹐以期找到中国在汇率问题上有所进展的蛛丝马迹﹐但每次都空手而归﹔他在美国声调越来越高的指责声在中国并未听到回音。而与此同时﹐中国却暗中加紧了与新加坡金管局(Monetary Authority of Singapore)官员的会晤。新加坡是世界上实施有管理的浮动汇率制最成功的国家之一﹐这种制度保证了新加坡几十年来在经济增长的同时通货膨胀也得到了控制。人民银行向新加坡金管局陆续派出中层官员﹐学习如何管理其汇率体系。

  2004年5月﹐中国在海滨城市大连召开了为期两天的会议﹐会上﹐周小川和他的副手听取了美国一流经济学家有关外汇管理问题的演讲。蒙代尔和斯坦福大学(Stanford University)的麦金农(Ronald McKinnon)不赞成中国放弃钉住美元制度。而戈德斯坦因和哈佛大学(Harvard University)的弗兰克(Jeffrey Frankel)则持相反意见。会议结束时﹐人民银行的一位高级官员站起来总结说﹐中国准备短期内采纳蒙代尔的建议﹐从长期计议则会采纳戈德斯坦因的建议﹐不过他们“不会告诉各位所谓短期究竟是指多长时间”。

  戈德斯坦因事後回忆说﹐那位官员表示﹐短期可能是1个月﹐也可能是5年。

  而在华盛顿﹐美国国会对人民币的不满情绪今年春季达到了顶点。4月16日﹐来自纽约的民主党参议院舒尔默(Charles Schumer)和南卡罗来纳州共和党人﹑参议员格莱汉姆(Lindsay Graham)极力要求对国务院每年一次的开支法案通过修正案﹐提出如果北京不同意让人民币升值﹐就对所有中国进口商品加徵27.5%的关税。最终参议院以67比33的投票结果同意对修正案进行讨论。这个一边倒地支持实施反对中国的法案的投票结果让布什政府也大为震惊。

  在美国财政部内部﹐人们的语调也开始出现明显变化。财政部另一位高级官员说﹐人们感觉到为中国辩护的力量精疲力竭了。大家总的来说有一种疲倦的感觉。5月19日﹐斯诺任命威廷顿(Olin Wethington)为与中国商谈人民币问题的特使。威廷顿长期在财政部任职﹐此前刚刚牵头对伊拉克国际债务中的很大一部分进行了大规模清算工作。威廷顿第二天就前往北京﹐开始了作为“人民币特使”的第一次中国之行(在接下来的两个月时间里﹐他又两次秘密对中国进行了为期一周的访问)。美国财政部一位官员说﹐“我们作出的判断是......在公众视线之外﹐还有很大的暗中采取谨慎行动的空间。“但我们意识到﹐需要在制度框架内扩大对话﹐并与政府其他部门接触﹐在更高层次上提出这个问题”。

  美国政府官员从未支持过舒尔默和格莱汉姆的法案﹐但它承认这个法案为他们应对北京提供了更大的周旋空间。在随後的7周时间里﹐威廷顿和特使团其他成员拜会了大量中国政府和商界的领导人﹐其中包括外交部﹑胡锦涛办公室和中国人民银行的高级官员以及中国共产党的高层人士。

  威廷顿对这些中方人士表示﹐如果中国不显着提高人民币汇率的灵活性﹐那将对美国方面产生非常不利的﹑布什政府也无力挽回的影响。据国际货币基金组织(IMF)官员说﹐到5月份时﹐中国有可能让人民币与一篮子货币挂钩的苗头已经很明显﹐有关部门用大量时间与新加坡金管局人士接触﹐了解新加坡外汇体系的运行情况。国内方面﹐一位与央行有工作往来的人士说﹐央行提出先升值5%﹐但由於其他部门担心升值太多影响出口﹐国务院(State Council)最後决定先升值2.1%。

  在6月底最後一次到访中国时﹐威廷顿注意到了中国人准备对人民币采取行动的强烈信号。但中国人也明确表示在华盛顿或美国国会直接施压的情况下他们不会采取任何行动。於是在6月30日﹐联邦储备委员会主席格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)以及斯诺公开前往国会山﹐与舒尔默和格莱汉姆举行了并不那麽“私下”的闭门会议。

  两位议员被告知﹐中国已准备采取行动﹐但除非参议院不再威胁要加徵关税。结束会面後两人宣布﹐将把对修正案的投票表决推迟到8月份国会休会期结束之後。

  上周三晚间﹐在中国宣布人民币升值之前数小时﹐布什政府收到了中国政府的正式通知﹐告知他们中国已经准备好调整汇率﹐并实行有管理的浮动汇率制﹐这种制度将使人民币汇率得以缓慢爬升或下跌。威廷顿随後准备再度前往北京﹐重申美国仍希望中国让人民币自由浮动。

  据知情人士说﹐香港方面事先也被告知了有关信息。这位人士说﹐他们有这个责任或者义务。

  第二天﹐就在晚上7点之前﹐中国官员向中国国家电视台晚间新闻节目的主编发送了政府的正式声明﹐并指示声明要作为新闻头条播出。声明同时还出现在中国人民银行和官方媒体新华社(Xinhua news agency)的网站上﹐两家网站很快就被网络用户点“爆”了。

  宣传部的官员也打电话给国内报纸的编辑﹐告诉他们在播发有关升值的消息时只能采用新华社的通稿﹐且不可另外作附加报导。

  一家大型英资银行驻上海的一位管理人士说﹕他们在管理突发事件方面的确是很在行的。我问过的每一个人事先都不知道马上就要升值了。

????

????新闻:财经 2005-07-27



2%只是初步调整?
  中国央行否认人民币再升值

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


● 吴新慧(上海特派员)

  在国内外市场仍存在人民币可能会再升值的期待中,中国人民银行发言人昨天“郑重声明”,渐进性是人民币汇率形成机制改革的一个重要原则,人民币升值2%并不是一些人所理解的只是个初步小调,事后还会进一步调高。

  发言人说,渐进性是指人民币汇率形成机制改革的渐进性,而不是指人民币汇率水平调整的渐进性。他强调,人民币汇率制度改革重在人民币汇率形成机制的改革,而非人民币汇率水平“在数量上的增减”。

  在这个大前提下, 中国上周四宣布人民币汇率初始调整升值2%,是指在人民币汇率形成机制改革的初始时刻就作一调整,调整水平为2%。而不是指人民币汇率第一步调整2%,接下来还会再调。

  这位发言人称,人民币汇率形成机制改革受到国内外媒体和有关方面的广泛关注和充分理解。“但也有国外的个别媒体对改革的有关内容,特别是对人民币对美元交易价格的调整制造误解,甚至错误地认为人民币升值2%只是初始调整,可能引发中国人民银行在不远的将来会进一步提高人民币汇率的预期。”

中国坚持汇率稳定

  摩根士丹利亚太首席经济学家谢国忠接受本报访问时说,中国当局此时针对人民币汇率发表声明,是要发放中国坚持人民币汇率稳定的信息。因为目前市场对人民币汇率会再调高有期待,引来许多投机行为,给人民币带来不稳定因素。

  “调高汇率本来是要放气的,却变成是给它打气,中国政府自然要表明立场。”

  虽然市场对人民币的炒作“并没有预料中那么热”,谢国忠认为中国政府还是要密切关注。像香港已出现人们争存人民币的现象。恒生银行上周五新增人民币存款额高达5000多万人民币,是平常业务淡静时的九倍,业务高峰时期的五倍。

  他说,中国政府在对人民币汇率讨论了两年后,才调整了2%,这是中国政府办事的特征,以稳定为第一,外国人务必要了解,不能期望人民币汇率会在短期内再调整。即使将来会调,也会是考虑相当时候,而且是不离保守的决定。

  “这次如果不是因为胡锦涛要访问美国,要在出访前改善中美关系,中国可能都不会在这个时候调整人民币汇率。中国政府做事,政治因素也是一重要考虑。我曾经说过,人民币汇率小调是给美国人面子,大调是不可能的,就是这么一回事。”

周小川:

汇率改革是自身需要

  中国央行行长周小川上周六在“宏观调控和中国银行业”论坛上也指出,人民币汇率改革的渐进性原则,反映的是中国整个改革的进程,“是一步一步走向市场经济,而汇率制度是不断改革的。”

  但他也强调,汇率改革是根据中国迈向社会主义市场经济优化资源配置而作出的决策,考虑的基点是自身改革以及长期稳定发展的需要。“不是跟别人商量沟通的结果。这一点一定要明确。”

  中国人民银行发言人昨天在声明中说,人民币汇率水平升值2%是根据汇率合理均衡水平测算出来的。这一调整幅度主要是从中国的贸易顺差程度和结构调整的需要来确定,同时也考虑了国内企业的承受能力和结构调整的适应能力。

  美国《华尔街日报》昨天指出,中国上调人民币汇率的决定,有助于推动不均衡的全球经济趋向平衡。而如果中国接下来对汇率还有更大的动作,亚洲各国也纷纷效仿,其结果将是美元走低,长期利率面临上涨压力。

  报道说,美元走低和长期利率上涨,虽不能令所有美国人都满意,却会促成美国减少进口、增加出口,并可抑制过热的住宅市场。“这一切都是美国政府内外的经济学家所乐于见到的。”



???-??-??????:??????????????

???-??-??????:??????????????人民网>>经济>>经济专题>>人民币汇率开始浮动之旅>>评论分析





人民日报述评:人民币改革是自身需要自主决定
———透视人民币汇率改革(上)
田俊荣

2005年07月26日09:15 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】


  迅雷不及掩耳。

  7月20日,上半年国民经济统计数据刚刚出炉,人们正沉浸在对经济形势的分析判断之中。

  仅仅一天之后,7月21日晚7时。中国人民银行就宣布了一条让全球震动的消息:经国务院批准,自7月21日起,我国开始实行以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度。

  猜测已久、热议不休的人民币汇率改革,终于在这一刻拉开了大幕。

  一次自身需要、自主决定的改革

  这次改革,决不是迫于某种国际压力,而是我国从自身改革发展的实际需要出发作出的重要决策。

  正如央行行长周小川强调的那样:“这是一种自主决定,是中国迈向社会主义市场经济和优化资源配置的需要,是改革和长期稳定发展的需要,而不是和其他国家沟通商量之后得出的结果。”

  1994年,我国改革了汇率双轨制,实行汇率并轨。汇率并轨之后,实行的是以市场供求为基础的、有管理的浮动汇率制度。

  如果用通俗的语言来描绘这一汇率制度,就是:企业和个人卖出或买入外汇都要通过外汇指定银行进行,外汇指定银行又进入银行间外汇市场,或将多余的外汇资金卖给其他银行,得到人民币,或用人民币向其他银行购买外汇,弥补外汇头寸的不足,这一买一卖,一供一求,就生成了人民币和外汇的比价,也就是人民币汇率;同时,央行设立一定的汇率浮动范围,当外汇供过于求时买入外汇,当外汇供不应求时卖出外汇,通过这样的调控方式来保持人民币汇率的基本稳定。

  1997年以前,人民币汇率稳中有升,海内外对人民币的信心不断增强。但此后由于亚洲金融危机爆发,为防止亚洲周边国家和地区货币轮番贬值使危机深化,中国作为一个负责任的大国,承诺人民币不贬值,并主动收窄了汇率浮动区间,但实行有管理的浮动汇率制度这一目标并没有改变。

  应当说,以市场供求为基础的、有管理的浮动汇率制度适应我国经济发展阶段、金融监管水平和企业承受能力,是符合中国国情的。但是,随着形势的发展,完善人民币汇率形成机制的必要性日益显露出来。换句话说,汇率改革,要改的并不是人民币汇率制度,更不是为了让人民币升值,而是旨在完善人民币汇率形成机制。

  ———完善人民币汇率形成机制,是建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制的内在要求,也是深化经济金融体制改革、健全宏观调控体系的重要内容。

  近年来,随着我国出口和外商投资的快速增长,相对应的,在国际收支平衡表上,表现为经常项目和资本项目“双顺差”;在银行间外汇市场上,表现为外汇源源涌入,供大于求。为了稳定人民币汇率,央行只能被动地收购大量外汇,相应地,就会投放大量人民币,从而增加了基础货币的供应。统计表明,央行通过这种外汇占款的方式投放的基础货币已占基础货币总量的90%!货币政策的独立性遭到了严重挑战。而货币供应的过快增长,会诱发投资扩张、通货膨胀压力、资产泡沫等问题。

  完善人民币汇率形成机制,让汇率形成机制更具弹性,能更好地发挥市场在资源配置中的基础性作用,有利于提高金融调控的主动性和有效性,进而有利于加强和改善宏观调控。

  ———完善人民币汇率形成机制,有利于贯彻以内需为主的经济可持续发展战略,优化资源配置。

  有专家坦言,如果长期固守原有的汇率形成机制,就可能影响经济结构的改善。

  其一,助长涉外部门和对内部门发展的不平衡。其二,影响三大产业比例的协调。其三,妨碍沿海向内陆正常的产业转移。汇率过于稳定,使粗加工的劳动密集型生产在沿海地区仍可以生存,缺乏向中西部转移的动力和压力。

  ———完善人民币汇率形成机制,适当增加汇率弹性,将增加投机资本流动收益的不确定性,有利于遏制资本大规模单边流动,防范和化解金融风险,维护金融稳定。

  汇率过于僵硬,降低了投机资本流动的汇率风险,可能诱发投机资本的大进大出,对经济发展和金融稳定造成冲击。1994年的墨西哥金融危机和1997年的亚洲金融危机都与此有直接关系。

  对此,周小川有一个非常形象的比喻。他说:“固定汇率好像打仗时手里拿的盾牌,无论你如何打来,我都坚持不动;如果我坚持不住,冲击就会造成影响。浮动汇率则像海绵垫子,你要打进来我就给你一个软的,进来就进来,我不让你打到我;等你想撤的时候,我还夹你一下,让你脱一层皮再走。”

  ———完善人民币汇率形成机制,有利于对外经济的发展。此举有助于促使企业加强技术创新、管理创新和品牌创造,加强市场营销、售后服务,从而从根本上提高企业的竞争力;还有助于保持进出口基本平衡,改善贸易条件。

  改革势在必行,改革又迫在眉睫。

  有专家坦言,人民币汇率改革如果长期拖延下去,会带来三大风险。

  首先是国内经济泡沫化的风险。如果通过外汇占款方式投放的基础货币过多,过多资金流向商品市场,就会诱发通货膨胀;流向资产市场,则会导致资产泡沫。经济泡沫性因素凸现,会使金融体系脆弱性加剧,会降低抵御货币冲击的能力。

  其次是货币政策独立性削弱的风险。“蒙代尔三元悖论”原理告诉我们,完全的资本开放、独立的货币政策和稳定的汇率,这三者,一国只能三选其二,而不可能三者兼得。

  第三是形势逆转的风险。如果一定要进行汇率改革的话,主动改比被动改好,升值压力下改比贬值压力下改好。

  从国际上看,波兰从20世纪90年代以来,经历了从单一盯住、盯住篮子货币、有管理浮动到自由浮动等汇率制度的演变。由于其汇率制度根据国内外形势变化主动调整,因而最大限度地避免了可能造成的经济社会震荡。而泰国在1997年之前一直盯住美元,不改汇率制度,结果在亚洲金融危机期间被迫大幅贬值,货币、金融危机由此爆发。

  汇率改革的机会常常转瞬即逝。机会来了,就要果断地抓住它!

  说千道万,一言以蔽之,人民币汇率改革,决不是“要我改”,而是“我要改”!

  一次逐步渐进、酝酿已久的改革

  央行的新闻发言人说,人民币汇率改革必须坚持渐进性的原则。

  什么是渐进性?周小川的回答是:“渐进性首先是指中国整个改革的进程,是一步一步走向市场经济,汇率制度是不断改革的。”

  早在1993年11月,党的十四届三中全会就明确提出,改革外汇管理体制,建立以市场为基础的有管理的浮动汇率制度和统一规范的外汇市场。人民币汇率改革的目标和任务跃然纸上。

  10多年来,中国在人民币汇率改革上做了大量工作,迈出了重要步伐。

  2001年,随着亚洲金融危机的平息,我国开始研究增强汇率弹性的问题。

  然而,随之而来的是2001年的“9·11”事件、2002年的美元大幅贬值、2003年的伊拉克战争和非典疫情,大大增加了汇率改革的不确定性,汇率改革再度放缓。

  2003年以后,由于人民币升值预期日趋强烈,加上国外一些人士对人民币汇率的指责日趋白热化,使这场改革复杂化。

  十年磨一剑。这不是一次心血来潮的改革,而是一次逐步渐进、酝酿已久的改革。

  一次出其不意、正当其时的改革

  今年3月14日,国务院总理温家宝在回答记者提问时说,人民币汇率改革何时出台、采取什么方案,“可能是一个出其不意的事情”。

  不久前,一些国际投资机构先后发布了5月8日和5月18日人民币升值的预言,遭到失败后,这些机构纷纷缄口失声,炒作人民币升值的热钱也在“降温”;不少人对这一话题已有所遗忘。改革就是在这样的预期氛围中“出其不意”地推出了!

  但细细剖析,汇率改革出其不意,却又正当其时:

  ———我国金融改革特别是国有商业银行改革已经取得了实质性进展;

  ———外汇管理正逐步放宽,外汇市场建设不断加强,市场工具逐步推广;

  ———上半年我国经济增长9.5%,居民消费价格上涨2.3%,正处于“高增长、低通胀”的最佳时期,中国经济完全有能力应付汇率改革可能带来的冲击;

  ———上半年外汇储备的存量和增量空前,6月末,外汇储备飙升至7110亿美元,考虑到国家为中国工商银行注资的150亿美元外汇储备,上半年外汇储备实际增加了1160亿美元,给人民币带来较大的升值压力,有必要通过汇率改革进行调整;

  ———世界经济运行平稳,美元利率稳步上升,一部分投机资本开始撤出,相对减轻了汇率改革带来的人民币升值压力。

  一次富有特色、幅度合理的改革

  7月21日,央行新闻发言人这样叙述人民币汇率改革内容:

  人民币汇率不再盯住单一美元,而是按照我国对外经济发展的实际情况,选择若干种主要货币,赋予相应的权重,组成一个货币篮子。同时,根据国内外经济金融形势,以市场供求为基础,参考一篮子货币计算人民币多边汇率指数的变化,实行有管理的浮动汇率,维护人民币汇率在合理均衡水平上的基本稳定。根据对汇率合理均衡水平的测算,人民币对美元即日升值2%,即1美元兑8.11元人民币。

  需要注意的是,“参考一篮子”不等于“盯住一篮子”。专家认为,盯住一篮子货币是指按照既定的货币种类、权重套算其汇率价值,这样一来,一国的货币当局基本没有了汇率的定价主动权;而参考一篮子,表明货币当局还可以将市场供求关系作为汇率定价的另一个重要依据,据此形成有管理的浮动汇率。据国际货币基金组织统计,到2002年,世界上实行盯住一篮子汇率机制的国家只有9个,并且都是人口数量、经济规模很小的国家。中国作为人口居世界第一、经济总量居世界第七的大国,实行盯住一篮子汇率机制显然不符合实际国情。

  2%的升值幅度也是一处妙笔。这一调整幅度主要是根据我国贸易顺差程度和结构调整的需要来确定的,同时也考虑了国内企业进行结构调整的适应能力。



来源:《人民日报》 (责任编辑:石希)

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透视人民币汇率改革(下)
人民日报述评:单边豪赌人民币升值不明智

人民网记者 田俊荣

2005年07月27日07:44 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】


  对中国经济总体上利大于弊

  人民币汇率改革的内容之一是:从7月21日起,人民币对美元升值2%,即1美元兑8.11元人民币。

  人民币汇率改革对中国经济的影响,需要全面地认识,客观地分析。

  一方面,汇率是一把“双刃剑”,汇率无论向上或向下波动,对经济都是有利有弊的。人民币升值有其固有的好处。比如,升值后,大量进口商品的人民币价格将随之下降,有可能带动国内整体物价水平的下跌,降低企业的成本。再如,升值后,同等数量的人民币可以兑换到更多的美元,有利于企业“走出去”,充分利用两个市场、两种资源,提高对外开放的水平。

  另一方面,汇率改革在短期内会对竞争力弱的企业的出口和就业产生一定影响,但总体上利大于弊。

  有人说,从理论上讲,人民币升值后,出口商出口商品所得的外汇收入,在国内兑换成的人民币将比原来减少,从而利润空间变小;而进口商用来兑换进口商品所需外汇的人民币也将比原来减少,从而利润空间变大。推而论之,人民币升值会抑制出口、鼓励进口。

  事实,不完全如此。

  应当看到,首先,贸易差额是由消费、投资等经济基本面因素决定的,取决于一国在国际贸易中的比较优势和竞争力,而不取决于汇率水平。从二战后到1987年底,日元和德国马克分别大幅升值了1.93倍和1.66倍,但两国的对外贸易依然保持了顺差格局。

  其次,目前我国总出口的60%以上是加工贸易。加工贸易是一种从境外保税进口全部或部分原辅材料、零部件、包装物料等,经境内企业加工装配后,将制成品出口的经营活动。人民币升值,有利于加工贸易的进口环节,不利于加工贸易的出口环节,影响有正有负,基本上可以视为中性。

  再有,我国的劳动力成本比较低,不仅远低于发达国家的工资水平,与其他大多数发展中国家相比也具有相当的竞争优势。比如,与泰国、菲律宾相比,我国的劳动力成本要低50%左右。人民币升值还是难以改变我国出口商品的价格竞争力。

  此外,汇率改革将引导企业积极培育非价格竞争力,增强自主创新能力,加快转变外贸增长方式,提高国际竞争力和抗风险能力。

  还有人说,汇率改革会使两种企业可能因为经营困难而裁员,一是部分出口企业,一是与进口商品有竞争的企业。

  事实,也不完全如此。

  应当看到,汇率改革对出口企业总体上还是利大于弊,所以,改革对出口企业的整体就业状况不会产生明显的负面作用。并且,汇率改革还将促使出口企业转向深加工和精加工,生产链条拉长,就业岗位增加,同时将引导一部分资源流向非贸易部门,促进第三产业发展,有利于扩大就业总规模。从国际上看,20世纪70年代英镑升值后、80年代日元升值后,英国和日本的第三产业都发展迅速。

  进口增多会不会影响就业呢?如果从静止的角度观察,回答也许是肯定的,但如果从动态的角度考量,回答是否定的。中国是一个处于经济快速发展时期的大国,内需潜力难以估量,进口越多,说明国内投资和消费增长越快,也就意味着就业增长的基础越来越扩大,涉外经济部门的就业也会随之增长。

  对百姓影响不大,企业当积极应对

  汇率改革在国内外金融市场可谓一石激起千层浪,但在普通百姓中却波澜不惊。

  7月22日,记者在北京金融街的中国工商银行、民生银行、北京银行等银行网点看到,没有出现众人排队要求将美元换成人民币的景象。网点员工坦言,业务量和平时差不多。

  波澜不惊不等于不关注。波澜不惊也是一种理性。

  商务部研究院研究员梅新育博士解释说,大多数百姓手中并没有多少美元,并且人民币对美元的升值幅度很小。加之在汇率改革时,央行还同步宣布,上调境内美元、港币的小额存款利率。显然,此举增加了外币投资的收益。这几种效应一叠加,自然会削弱百姓将美元兑换成人民币的动机。

  专家认为,百姓在汇率改革中至少能享受到三大好处。其一,人民币小幅升值,会适当降低进口商品的价格,平稳国内物价,方便百姓生活;其二,出国人员同样的人民币能换更多的美元,在国外消费时更划算;其三,伴随着汇率改革,对外开放步伐加快,外汇兑换限额、携带外汇出入境限额等外汇管理有可能进一步放宽,百姓显然能从中受益。

  即使您手里有美元存款,也并不完全意味着这笔钱已经白白地损失了2%。对此,央行行长周小川通俗地说:“如果(外汇存款)是美元的话,还取决于你是不是想把它换为人民币来花。如果你现在换的话,可能跟过去相比是损失了2%,但是如果这些美元还是打算比如出国旅游时候用,或者是出国的时候采购一些东西,或者也许是子女(出国)上学的时候用,那么它的购买力跟原来一样,也没有变化。”

  与百姓的波澜不惊相比,企业的心情更为复杂。

  对不同行业,汇率改革的影响各不相同。梅新育说,总体而言,汇率改革对出口依存度较高的纺织品等轻工行业有影响;对进口原料较多的钢铁行业当属“利好”;对进口数量较大的能源行业,其商品价格以人民币计价会下降;汽车行业可能会受到一定的降价压力,因为不仅其进口元件以人民币计价降低了,而且钢铁等投入品的成本也会因此而有所降低。

  “奶酪”被动了,是抱怨,是观望,还是积极应对?

  周小川说:“企业调整的策略应该是提高自己的竞争力,产品升级换代,争取价钱卖得好一点,克服像其它方面的这些变化对它负面的影响。”

  央行副行长吴晓灵最近表示,企业应该加强对衍生工具的学习和运用,主动适应变化。央行正力推衍生产品的发展,尽早为社会提供避险工具。

  最关键的是,企业应当逐步养成对灵活性的偏好。

  周小川认为,在进行汇率机制改革的过程中,企业要改变固定性的偏好。以前企业各种条件都比较固定,但现在面临越来越多市场条件的变化,也应开始学会进行各种各样的调整。从微观经济讲,灵活度越大越有市盈率,也越能适应当前的变化。汇率机制作为一个价格机制,既是宏观经济组成部分,同时也能反映整个国际经济、贸易、资本流动的客观局面。这些客观环境的变化,也是需要企业去响应的。

  有利于世界经济成长和稳定

  作为一个负责任的大国,中国在汇率问题上的表现可圈可点。

  1997年,亚洲金融危机爆发。为了防止周边国家和地区的货币轮番贬值使危机深化,中国政府毅然宣布人民币不贬值,并主动收窄了人民币汇率的浮动区间。

  时至今日,本色不改。

  2005年3月14日,国务院总理温家宝在回答记者提问时明确表示,中国是一个负责任的国家,对于人民币升值和汇率机制的改革,我们不仅要考虑本国的利益,而且要考虑对周边国家和世界的影响。

  2005年5月16日,温家宝总理在会见美国商会代表团时又一次明确表示,中国是负责任的国家,汇率改革也要考虑对周边国家、地区以至世界经济金融的影响。

  中国是这样说的,更是这样做的。

  央行行长助理易纲披露,汇率改革出台后,美国、英国、日本、韩国、马来西亚、德国等许多国家都在第一时间表态,欢迎中国政府完善人民币汇率形成机制改革,认为这将有助于全球经济稳定。

  西方七国集团财政部长和中央银行行长发表声明说:“我们欢迎中国政府所作出的迈向更具弹性汇率机制的举措。这将有助于全球经济成长和稳定。”

  欧洲央行总裁特里谢说:“中国迈向更具弹性的汇率机制,有利于其在全球经济中更好地发挥作用,并有助于维护全球金融稳定。”

  中国,再一次以自己的实际行动诠释了“责任”的含义。

  人民币汇率将在合理、均衡水平上保持基本稳定

  央行反复阐明,人民币汇率改革重在人民币汇率形成机制的改革,而非人民币汇率水平在数量上的增减。

  但是,还是有一些人热衷猜测人民币汇率的未来走向。境外个别媒体甚至认为,人民币升值2%只是初始调整,在不远的将来会进一步提高人民币汇率。

  对此,7月26日,央行的新闻发言人郑重声明:人民币汇率初始调整水平升值2%,是指在人民币汇率形成机制改革的初始时刻就作一调整,调整水平为2%。并不是指人民币汇率第一步调整2%,事后还会有进一步的调整。

  事实上,人民币汇率改革的总体目标是,建立健全以市场供求为基础的、有管理的浮动汇率体制,保持人民币汇率在合理、均衡水平上的基本稳定。人民币汇率大幅波动,对我国经济金融稳定会造成较大的冲击,不符合我国的根本利益。完善人民币汇率形成机制改革决不会出现这种情况。

  这位发言人剖析说,首先,汇率形成机制改革后,人民币不再盯住任何一种单一货币,而是以市场供求为基础,参考一篮子汇率进行调节。国际市场主要货币汇率的相互变动,客观上减少了人民币汇率的波动性。

  其次,随着汇率等经济杠杆在资源配置中的基础性作用增强,外汇供求关系进一步理顺,国际收支调节机制逐步建立健全,国际收支会趋于基本平衡,为人民币汇率稳定奠定了坚实的经济基础。

  第三,我国将积极协调好宏观经济政策,稳步推进各项改革,为人民币汇率稳定提供良好的政策环境。

  此外,央行将努力提高调控水平,改进外汇管理,保持人民币汇率在合理、均衡水平上的基本稳定。

  专家认为,从中长期来看,汇率改革并不一定会带来人民币的一路升值。辩证地看,人民币汇率走势受国内、国际两个方面的影响,而每个方面都存在着升值和贬值的因素。从历史上看,德国马克、日元也不是一路升值的,而是有阶段性的调整。因此,投机资本单边豪赌人民币升值不是明智之举。

  《人民日报》 (2005年07月27日 第二版)



来源:人民网-《人民日报》 (责任编辑:徐辉)

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

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央行就人民币汇率初始调整水平升值2%发表郑重声明



2005年07月26日12:51 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】


  新华社北京7月26日电(记者张旭东)中国人民银行新闻发言人26日郑重声明称,人民币汇率初始调整水平升值2%,是指在人民币汇率形成机制改革的初始时刻就作一调整,调整水平为2%。并不是指人民币汇率第一步调整2%,事后还会有进一步的调整。

  这位发言人称,人民币汇率形成机制改革受到国内外媒体 和有关方面的广泛关注和充分理解。但也有国外的个别媒体对改革的有关内容,特别是对人民币对美元交易价格的调整制造误解,甚至错误地认为人民币升值2%只是初始调整,“可能引发中国人民银行在不远的将来会进一步提高人民币汇率的预期”。

  为准确理解人民币汇率形成机制改革,人民银行现郑重声明如下:

  一、人民币汇率初始调整水平升值2%,是指在人民币汇率形成机制改革的初始时刻就作一调整,调整水平为2%。并不是指人民币汇率第一步调整2%,事后还会有进一步的调整。

  二、人民币汇率水平升值2%是根据汇率合理均衡水平测算出来的。这一调整幅度主要是从我国贸易顺差程度和结构调整的需要来确定的,同时也考虑了国内企业的承受能力和结构调整的适应能力。这个幅度基本上趋近于实现商品和服务项目大体平衡。

  三、渐进性是人民币汇率形成机制改革的一个重要原则。渐进性是指人民币汇率形成机制改革的渐进性,而不是指人民币汇率水平调整的渐进性。人民币汇率制度改革重在人民币汇率形成机制的改革,而非人民币汇率水平在数量上的增减。

  这位发言人称,人民银行热诚欢迎国内外各界继续关注、支持人民币汇率形成机制改革,也希望有关媒体本着负责任的态度,准确理解改革的精神,客观报道改革的有关内容。



来源:新华社 (责任编辑:雷阳)

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Greater China
Jul 26, 2005



SPEAKING FREELY
What about the capital account?
By Huw McKay

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

Editor's note: ATol would like to define the following economics terms used by Mr McKay (definitions from Wikipedia) as a courtesy to readers who may be unfamiliar with them.

Current account: records the net flow of money into a country resulting from trade in goods and services and transfer payments made from abroad. The current account itself comprises of 3 accounts: the trade account, income account and transfers account. A trade deficit (surplus) arises when there is a deficit (surplus) in the merchandise trade within the current account.

Capital account: records the net flow of money into a country from purchases and sales of assets such as stocks, bonds and land.

The July 21 announcement on China's altered foreign exchange regime has implications beyond rapprochement with the US in the matter of fiduciary suzerainty. The major side effect of the "compromise regime" that China has chosen is that it restricts the potential timing of a shift to full capital account convertibility. And that in turn will restrict the potential timing of any future alterations of China's foreign exchange policy in favor of flexibility.

This collection of statements may seem counterintuitive at first. But read on.

Under benign internal and external economic conditions, the normative path from a fixed to a floating exchange rate is well defined. The following catalogue of tasks will get the job done over a decade or so.

1. Establish convertibility on the current account, and unify onshore trading of the currency.
2. Work toward establishing an alternative anchor for monetary policy. Inflation targeting is the popular choice, the successful application of which requires central bank independence, the unification of monetary and foreign exchange policy, and the establishment of inflation-fighting "credibility" with the market.
3. Establish an offshore forward market to provide domestic institutions with the tools to hedge the risks associated with flexibility.
4. Widen the allowable trading band around the existing peg to give domestic institutions a chance to "train" themselves to deal with exchange rate volatility under protected conditions.
5. Work to alleviate any existing asymmetries in the capital account, and have a strategy for ensuring capital account convertibility in the future.
6. Progressively increase the allowable degree of volatility as competency improves.
7. When the allowable degree of volatility reaches a level where it is essentially redundant on most trading days, quietly move to a free-floating market-determined exchange rate.

China's chosen path is a curious one when viewed through this grid. Besides the first point above, China has now deviated substantially from this path. Indeed, given the nature of the deviation, China's ability to get back on the path later on, should it decide to do so, has been compromised. The reason for this is that the assumption "benign internal and external conditions" is already breached on at least two counts. The first is the weakness of China's domestic banking system. The second is the haunting specter of the highly mobile community of international financial speculators, who are armed and ready to place enormous bets on trending markets anywhere in the world.

China's brittle banking system clearly inhibits international financial reform. It is not foreign exchange rate flexibility per se that threatens these banks - it is reduced access to domestic savings. China's banks, particularly the big four state institutions, survive by accessing captive domestic savings at meager interest rates and consuming a fat margin on performing loans. Take away that prop via savings outflows, and the profitability of the banking system is seriously weakened. This situation points to a go-slow on capital account reforms.

The second breach is particularly damaging. China has moved from a soft peg to an intermediate regime. The difference between the two is that the second has the potential to be flexible, although we know nothing about the eventuality yet. This potential is the key. The market now has an open invitation to charge at the matador, an opportunity that did not exist under the prior arrangements.

That opportunity will heighten the intervention requirements to keep the exchange rate stable on busy days. There are no guarantees that reserves will accumulate at a slower pace over the coming months, and the weight of flows will be determined to some extent by the degree to which capital can swiftly ingress and egress Fortress China.

In this analysis it is the ease of egress that has our attention. The administration has made their incentives in the matter of capital account reform doubly strong. The banks won't like the reform of capital controls, and neither will the monetary authority, which is trying to keep a tenuous grip on the rate of growth in the money supply.

Why is capital account reform so important? It is crucial to remove the asymmetries present in the existing arrangements, to enable a clearer balance between supply and demand for domestic and foreign currencies. This balance is critical to the "training wheels" phase of international financial reform. This is the period in which firms learn to deal with heightened exchange rate flexibility and banks learn to deal with two-way cross-border capital flows. By adjusting the axis of the foreign exchange/capital account where the foreign pressure was most strongly brought to bear, China has impaired its near-term ability to reform the other arm.

Thus, China has chosen a reform chronology that is out of step with our assessment of the optimal theoretical conditions for this delicate process. It is a struggle to paint this move as anything but politically designed. The economic impact will not be significant, so it bears little risk from a growth perspective. As an open policy of diplomatic appeasement, it is short of the mark but certainly shows a willingness to engage and compromise. However, as an important initial step in a sharply defined strategy to reform the structure of China's economic institutions, it falls down rather badly.

Huw McKay is a senior international economist at Westpac Bank in Sydney, Australia. He is the bank's spokesperson on pan-Asian economic and market issues, and manages the bank's foreign exchange and global growth forecasting processes.
Mr McKay is a long-time proponent of gradualism regarding
the deregulation of China's international financial infrastructure.

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing.

China's Currency Move

China's Currency Move
China's Currency Move

Post
Friday, July 22, 2005; A22



THE UNITED States and China are at loggerheads on several fronts: China's military buildup, its piracy of intellectual property, its human rights abuses. But one potential flash point has been managed successfully so far, to the credit of the Bush administration. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow has persuaded Congress to shelve bad legislation that would slap tariffs on China to punish it for maintaining an undervalued currency. Meanwhile, Mr. Snow has urged the Chinese to reform their currency policy for their own good. Yesterday China took a first step in that direction, abandoning a decade-old policy of pegging the yuan to the dollar.

China's move is too cautious to do more than dent its trade surplus, much less cure the alarming U.S. trade deficit. The yuan will now be worth 2 percent more, in dollar terms, than before the announcement; the monthly wage of a Chinese factory worker will move from, say, $100 to $102, a trivial difference. Even so, China's announcement is symbolically important. With China having shown itself capable of one currency move, further adjustments now seem more likely. In time, the policy of pegging the currency may give way to a more flexible, market-driven "float." This is the right direction to head in. Allowing the currency to float would strengthen China's ability to manage its own economy, softening the recent pattern of inflationary booms followed by painful slowdowns.

From the global perspective, the stakes are even higher. In the past decade or so, the world has come to rely on the United States to drive economic growth. Both the U.S. government and American consumers have borrowed to spend lavishly, and the spending has stimulated not only the U.S. economy but also export-driven growth elsewhere. Meanwhile, European and Japanese demand for American goods isn't expanding fast because those economies are sluggish. But the real puzzle is beyond Japan, in the rest of Asia. The region grew an astonishing 8 percent last year, a rate that would normally be expected to entail surging demand for imports. But the Asians continued to run a large trade surplus. Their growth was based on sizzling U.S. demand, not on demand from their own consumers.

This is not sustainable. Americans cannot go on borrowing from Asians to buy Asian goods forever. To fix this imbalance, Americans have to sell more goods and Asians have to consume more. Raising the value of Asian currencies is one mechanism to achieve this: It makes American goods more competitive and Asian consumers richer. China's cautious decision yesterday has already been emulated by Malaysia; other Asian countries, which have felt unable to revalue against the dollar for fear that they would lose competitiveness vis-à-vis China, may now reconsider. Whether they do may depend on whether China builds on its move with further revaluations in the next few months. Having taken the first step, China's leaders must have the courage to keep walking.

© 2005 The Washington Post Company

Monday, July 25, 2005

Yuan move an 'initial' step - PBOC head - Yahoo! News

Yuan move an 'initial' step - PBOC head - Yahoo! NewsBack to Story - Help
Yuan move an 'initial' step - PBOC head By Scott Hillis
Sat Jul 23, 8:45 AM ET



The head of China's central bank on Saturday described this week's revaluation of the yuan as an initial step whose benefits outweighed its drawbacks.

"We made an initial 2 percent adjustment of the exchange rate level," Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People's Bank of China, told state television.

He said the central bank would adopt a gradual approach to reform of the country's exchange rate regime.

"China's overall buying power has been increased, the currency is stronger and has more value. The positive effects on the economy will be much, much greater than the negative effects," Zhou said.

Zhou spoke two days after China revalued the yuan, or renminbi, by 2.1 percent in a long-anticipated move.

At the same time, China scrapped the currency's decade-long peg to the dollar and replaced it with a system under which its value will be managed with reference to a basket of currencies.

Economists have since been feverishly debating how quickly the central bank would make use of the new flexibility to push the yuan even higher.

Earlier on Saturday, Zhou said the revaluation would help smooth out global trade imbalances but will not have a big impact on America's trade deficit.

"After the change in the exchange rate, export companies should probably increase their prices. That can help correct imbalances in global trade in an orderly way," Zhou told a banking

'SMALL IMPACT ON U.S.'

Zhou said China had made the shift not because of foreign pressure but because it would promote China's long-term growth and stability.

Beijing had decided against a larger move of 5 percent partly out of concern that cheaper imports would squeeze domestic firms and trigger deflation, a state newspaper said.

A 5 percent revaluation would shave 1.4 percentage points off of China's economic growth and bring consumer inflation down 1.4 percentage points, the China Business newspaper said, citing a source familiar with government studies of various scenarios.

China's second quarter GDP grew 9.5 percent from a year earlier while annual consumer inflation was 1.6 percent in June.

Zhou told the conference that China had dropped the dollar peg because the U.S. currency had become too volatile in recent years, partly reflecting economic problems include large trade and budget deficits.

The central bank chief offered the same analysis as Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that the currency shift would not make much difference to the U.S. trade deficit, which hit a record $617.6 billion last year.

The bilateral deficit with China was $162 billion.

"The renminbi revaluation will help the U.S. trade deficit but the effect will be extremely small because the U.S. economy is so huge," Zhou said. China's economy was just on-seventh the size of America's, he said.

(Additional reporting by Kevin Yao)



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Yuan won't aid US deficit much-PBOC head - Yahoo! News

Yuan won't aid US deficit much-PBOC head - Yahoo! NewsBack to Story - Help
Yuan won't aid US deficit much-PBOC head By Scott Hillis
Sat Jul 23, 8:12 AM ET



This week's revaluation of the yuan will help smooth out global trade imbalances but will not have a big impact on America's trade deficit, China's central bank chief said on Saturday.

Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People's Bank of China, was making his first public remarks since Beijing revalued the yuan , or renminbi, by 2.1 percent on Thursday in a move long anticipated in financial markets.

At the same time, China scrapped the currency's decade-long peg to the dollar and replaced it with a system under which its value will be managed with reference to a basket of currencies.

"After the change in the exchange rate, export companies should probably increase their prices. That can help correct imbalances in global trade in an orderly way," Zhou told a banking conference.

Also on Saturday, a state newspaper said policy makers had debated a larger move of 5 percent, but chose the smaller adjustment partly out of concern that a flood of cheaper imports could squeeze domestic producers and trigger deflation.

A 5 percent revaluation would shave 1.4 percentage points off of China's economic growth, and bring consumer inflation down 1.4 percentage points, the China Business newspaper said, citing a source familiar with the studies.

"The negative effects a 5 percent revaluation would have on the economy might be too large," the newspaper quoted the source as saying.

China's second quarter GDP grew 9.5 percent from a year earlier while annual consumer inflation was 1.6 percent in June.

'SMALL' IMPACT ON U.S.

Zhou, smiling and looking relaxed, said China had made the shift not because of foreign pressure but because it would promote China's long-term growth and stability.

He said China had dropped the dollar as the yuan's sole anchor because the U.S. currency had become too volatile in recent years.

This partly reflected America's economic problems, including large trade and budget deficits, which Washington must tackle, Zhou said.

The central bank chief offered the same analysis as Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that the currency shift would not make much difference to the U.S. trade deficit, which hit a record $617.6 billion last year.

The bilateral deficit with China was $162 billion.

"The renminbi revaluation will help the U.S. trade deficit but the effect will be extremely small because the U.S. economy is so huge," Zhou said. China's economy was just on-seventh the size of America's, he noted.

Zhou explained the advantages that greater exchange rate flexibility confers on China's economy but acknowledged that a basket system, entailing daily changes in the yuan's value, introduced a degree of uncertainty for companies.

(Additional reporting by Kevin Yao)




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FT.com / World / Asia-Pacific - Renminbi�s tight rein a damper on US hopes

FT.com / World / Asia-Pacific - Renminbi�s tight rein a damper on US hopesRenminbi’s tight rein a damper on US hopes
>By Mure Dickie in Beijing
>Published: July 22 2005 18:42 | Last updated: July 22 2005 18:42
>>
China kept its newly unpegged and revalued currency on a tight rein on Friday, with the renminbi ending the day slightly lower against the dollar.

The decline appeared intended by Beijing to cool hopes that the policy change would open the way to the type of significant appreciation Washington has been demanding. US critics say the renminbi is undervalued by more than 20 per cent and gives China an unfair trade advantage.

In its first day of trade after a 2.1 per cent revaluation against the dollar, the renminbi slipped to 8.1111 from its opening of 8.1100.

Although the new mechanism allows the renminbi to rise or fall up to 0.3 per cent against the dollar each trading day, China's domestic currency market is dominated by the People's Bank of China, the central bank, with other traders playing a relatively minor role.

But on Friday international investors still expected more rises. In Singapore, one-year renminbi non-deliverable forwards rose to about 7.64 per dollar, a level that predicts further revaluation of more than 6 per cent by the middle of next year. Chinese stocks rose and shares of Asian exporters fell by magnitudes that also suggested another renminbi appreciation was likely.

Merrill Lynch, the US investment bank, forecast that the renminbi would rise to 7.5 to the dollar by the end of this year. Other analysts were more conservative. Bank of America saw the reminbi being held at 8.11 to the dollar until the year-end, while BNP Paribas believed Beijing would allow the renminbi to firm to 7.9 to the dollar by the year-end.

In early trading in London on Friday, eurozone government bond prices surged to a five-year high relative to US Treasury prices, as some investors concluded that Asian central banks would buy fewer US government bonds in future.

Although US Treasury prices later recovered slightly due to terrorism concerns, some investment banks think China’s move marks a watershed for the US bond market, points to higher yields in the future. “China will have to sell dollar assets while buying assets in other currencies, such as euro assets.. we expect further underperformance of US Treasuries,“ said BNP Paribas.

Expectations of future currency moves are widely seen as likely to fuel a renewed rush of speculative funds into China by companies and individuals who can find ways around the country's capital controls.

However, Xia Bin, director general of the Financial Research Institute under the State Council, China's cabinet, warned speculators against harbouring “illusions” about further revaluation, saying Beijing was likely to move carefully. No “clear” appreciation was likely in the remainder of this year, Mr Xia said.

The China Daily, Beijing's official English-language newspaper, said expectation of a revaluation bigger than Thursday's 2.1 per cent “was, and will be, unrealistic”.

China’s new exchange rate regime, described as a managed float to be set with reference to an undisclosed basket of currencies, is seen as giving policymakers greater flexibility in adjusting renminbi levels while retaining their final control of the currency.

Yu Yongding, a member of the People's Bank's monetary policy committee and a long standing supporter of revaluation, said he did not think China would allow dramatic changes in the exchange rate.

“The principle is stability as well as flexibility,” Prof Yu said. “We don't want to encourage speculative capital inflows.”

Additional reporting by Justine Lau in Hong Kong and Gillian Tett and Steve Johnson in London

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Find this article at:
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/d4705392-fad6-11d9-a0f6-00000e2511c8,ft_acl=,s01=1.html

Those Clever Chinese

Those Clever Chinese

Those Clever Chinese

By: John Mauldin, Millennium Wave Advisors






Paris, London and Ouzilly


Last week I said that for this week's letter we would look at the US trade deficit and China, and in particular the possible revaluation of the currency and its effect upon the trade deficit. China obliged by revaluing the yuan (Renminbi). This is both more, and less, than it seems. There is a lot to cover, so let's jump right in.

Let's first look at what China did. They allowed the yuan to rise by 2%, with a daily 0.3% trading band based on the price of the previous day. While in theory this could allow for a significant price increase over a period of several months, in practice it is unlikely to do so. Allowing the yuan to rise too rapidly would be highly destabilizing to the Chinese economy. You can take it to the bank, even an undercapitalized Chinese one, that the Chinese government will do everything in its power to maintain stability.

Further, instead of pegging the yuan to the dollar, it is now going to be pegged to a basket of currencies. Because it is a basket reference rate, it will be possible for the yuan to both rise and fall against the dollar. Can you imagine the consternation of Congress if the dollar rises against the yuan? Let's look at how that could happen.

"The basket is likely to be heavily dominated by the USD. Using China's trade weights, normalized, a five currency basket would have the following weights: USD (27%), JPY [Japan](31%), HKD (Hong Kong] (24%), EUR (15%), and GBP [Great Britain](4%). The hard dollar pegs (USD and HKD) account for close to 50% of the basket. If you consider the JPY as a soft USD peg, the weight on the dollar could be as high as 80%. This means USD/RMB will still be very 'docile', with the index being 'sticky' relative to the USD." (Morgan Stanley)

In essence, only 20% of the potential basket proposed by Morgan Stanley would actually float in any real sense. If the euro and the British pound were to sell off against the dollar it would cause the value of the basket to fall relative to the dollar, and thus would have the effect of lowering the price of the yuan. This could be a real scenario, as the euro and the whole union are now in a great deal of uncertainty, not to mention really slow growth. The markets hate both.

And if the Chinese add in some local currencies like the Singaporean and Malaysian, which are managed against the dollar, it could be even more stable. Let's see what the ever astute George Friedman of Stratfor has to say about the Chinese situation"

"Chinese currency reserves stand now at some $711 billion -- more than $100 billion of which was added just this year. Beijing has been printing currency non-stop to balance this capital inflow, maintain the peg and prevent inflation. The increased political pressure on the government has only added to the inflow of speculative capital. Over the past year, the government has taken several steps to increase the outflow of capital, albeit in a controlled manner. It has raised limits on the amount of money students and tourists can take abroad, encouraged Chinese firms to invest overseas and is now loosening restrictions on the conversion and repatriation of money for foreign companies operating in China.

"But Beijing is constantly looking to the past in moving forward. It fears a repeat of the Mexican peso crisis or the Asian economic crisis. The Chinese economic reforms are at a critical stage: Unemployment is rising, both in official numbers and in unofficial estimates. Despite a 9.5 percent growth rate, China just cannot create enough new jobs for its growing population -- particularly as it modernizes the agriculture sector and faces continued challenges to its labor-intensive exports.

"Beijing has made many feints at changing the yuan peg -- most recently in early May, when an article in the online version of the official People's Daily stated a yuan revaluation was coming within a week. The article was later pulled and a retraction issued, saying the piece had been a mis-translation of a different article, but the idea was clearly floated -- and Beijing carefully monitored the international reaction. Thursday's 2 percent revaluation and the announcement that there may be more baby steps coming amount to just one more probe into the potential impact of a larger revaluation or a future move to a real float.

"For now, Beijing is moving cautiously. Thursday's announcement caught many off-guard, particularly as just a few days before, after a meeting of the PBoC heads and the heads of regional branches, the bank announced it would keep the yuan rate "basically stable" for the second half of the year -- a euphemism for no change in the currency rate. Thus far, reaction to the news has been somewhat muddled by a second wave of attacks in London. However, shortly after the Chinese announcement, Malaysia said it might modify its peg, and in trading, the yen and the won moved with the yuan change.

"This will not be the last adjustment by the PBoC, and its future alterations will be driven by politics as much as economics -- but always with an eye toward internal Chinese stability."

Those Clever Chinese

Right now we don't know what the basket will actually look like. It is doubtful that China will announce the make-up of the basket. Clever currency traders will soon be running a regression analysis that will give us a reasonable idea. Of course, it will be very risky to trade on that, because the Chinese could change the makeup of the basket at any time. My bet is they will do so from time to time just to cause a lot of pain to hedge funds so as to discourage speculation.

What those clever Chinese have really done is take some of the wind out of the sails of the protectionist camp. This new currency regime is essentially the same as that of Singapore. You don't see anyone in the protectionist camp ranting about the unfair currency manipulation of Singapore. The Chinese will be able to, quite correctly, point out that if we have no problems with Singapore then we should therefore have no problems with them.

In practice, what I think the Chinese will do is to slowly allow the yuan to appreciate. By slowly, I mean 2-3-4-5 years and by 5-10-15%. This is going to be like watching paint dry. It will not be the stuff that great speculations are made of. And since local Asian currencies are really pegging themselves to the Chinese yuan, it will mean slower appreciation in most of those currencies as well.

Think about it from the Chinese viewpoint. Using round numbers, say we buy $100 billion of a variety of widgets from the Chinese. If they were to allow the yuan to appreciate by 20% in one year that would mean we could still spend $100 billion, but we would only get 80% as many widgets as we did the year before. Or we could spend $125 billion to maintain our supply of widgets, but that would mean a greater trade deficit. And it would also mean that the American consumer would have to find another $25 billion from somewhere.

Of course, in reality it does not work that way. China is starting to have a huge excess capacity problem in many areas. In the real world, Walmart says I want you to give me the same number of widgets per dollar or I go somewhere else. This could mean your competitor in the next province or in another country. This would mean that the profit margin of many Chinese companies get squeezed as they try to maintain market share to get cash flow to service loans and pay employees, when profit margins are already quite low. You can only squeeze so much.

I met veteran China hand, Simon Hunt, last April in London (of Simon Hunt Strategic Services). He spends a great deal of time touring China and meeting with both business and government leaders. He is "wired." I pay attention when he talks about China. He sends this note:

"The issue of surplus capacity has become very worrying for policy makers in Beijing also, because there is no pricing power and, therefore, there will be an impact on the financial sector. Every company will need a piece of the same pie. Prices will fall even more. Companies will need more loans to survive and so on. The deflation story, so frightening to Greenspan, will grow into a live problem in China. Even with rising demand, prices continue to fall because of this chronic surplus capacity. There is a risk of a large knock-on impact on the financial sector, less on the big banks, but more focused on the local and regional banks and money co-operatives, of which there are about 120 of the former and 30,000 of the latter category.

"Let me illustrate this central government concern with a simple story. About a year ago, I had dinner with a top policy advisor. We chatted at length on this subject, because it had been a concern of mine for two or three years. My friend listened, but made no comment so I got the distinct impression that the subject was not on their horizon. A month ago I again had dinner with him. Before the drinks arrived, he told me than unless China's bubble of surplus manufacturing capacity was pricked China would have a recession. So, clearly, the issue is now very much on their minds.

"Two days later I was in Ningbo with an industrial friend, who is well respected in the local government and banking circles. Only a few days prior to my arrival, the governor called in the leading local industrialists and told them the following:

1. Businesses that only focus on creating capacity without regard to profitability will not receive local government support

2. The new focus must be on return on capital investment

3. Businesses must go up the value added scale. This means introducing new technology, more expenditure on R&D, taking out more patents etc., and

4. You are encouraged to go further inland if you want to expand. Funding for expansion in Ningbo is now very tight and land licenses difficult and expensive to obtain.

"The last point is very important. It is the cornerstone of new government policy, which will be seen when the new 5-Year Plan is brought out either late this year or early in 2006.

"Urbanization of coastal cities will be slowed sharply. Costs have become too expensive and how to manage the migration of workers is a difficult issue. Instead, new development of industry will be encouraged to go into the rural sectors, where transport systems have improved, where land costs are a fraction of that in the coastal cities and where wages are one-third or less."

So the upshot is that we are going to see more factories in areas where labor costs are even less. Right now, per capita income is China is about 3% of that in the US. It is much higher in the cities but less in the countryside, where development is going to go.

So the Chinese revalue their currency by 2% and over the fullness of time by another 8% or so. In terms of the cost of labor to their competitiveness, that is meaningless. You could give every worker in China a 20% raise and it would have a much smaller pricing effect on finished products.

Simon illustrates what he means by capacity glut. The Chinese keep building factories and production lines even when they clearly don't need any more. Every town and province wants its own widget factory, and the state banks fund them. He cites many factories which are expanding capacity even though their markets have a serious surplus of capacity.

In an area he knows well, Simon points out that if the plans or "silly practices" (his term) in one industry are carried through, China will have the capacity to supply the entire world with the tubing required for air conditioners. Chinese firms are selling tubing anywhere from 35-70% less than competing companies in Europe and Asia, and at below the real costs of their competitors, and maybe below their real costs.

So, is the whole world all going to be buying Chinese goods? Should we just pack it all in? In a word, no. "Moreover, China is no longer being considered the first choice for new investment by manufacturing companies in Taiwan or S Korea; the first choice is now being given to other countries in Asia, such as India, Vietnam and now Malaysia....For instance, only on Friday, Flextronics, the world's leading contract electronics maker, announced that it would expand its Malaysian manufacturing facilities to counter rising costs in China. Peter Tan, the company's Asian President, said 'Its pretty clear that in China there is only one way that costs will go, and that is up, given the fact that China is so dependent on the rest of the world for its energy needs...There are a lot of odds being stacked up against our existing presence in China'."

The Chinese are up against the proverbial wall. Their problems are not without precedent and will require some pain to solve, but they can be solved. But they do not need some shock, such as a too rapid currency revaluation, to upset what is already a delicate equilibrium.

Over time, the dollar will fall, and perhaps significantly, against the yuan. But it will be, as Paul McCulley is wont to say, in the fullness of time.

The entire world needs to re-balance. Perhaps it is that we are always in the act of re-balancing, but today the lack of balance seems pronounced. The US trade deficit is growing. China is building too much capacity. Politicians have promised benefits to the boomer generations in the US, Europe and Japan that the next generation cannot hope to be able to financially deliver, and therefore they will not. There will be adjustments (a rebalancing) to the promises. Globalization is stressing the labor markets of the world. Governments everywhere overspend and mostly over-tax.

All of this high wire rebalancing act will take place in the fullness of time. There are those who think the dollar is going to break under the weight of the trade deficit. It could happen any moment. Then again, I would suggest the trade deficit could go on a lot longer and get a lot worse before the new world balance comes about.

Today the trade deficit is running close to $700 billion. The US is exporting electronic dollars and the rest of the world gives us their widgets. Then they take those dollars and buy our debt, helping keep our interest rates low. As I have documented in previous letters, foreigners are taking an increasing percentage of the new US debt supply, as our government debt is going down faster than projected. (I should note that this is because tax receipts are up and not because of congress holding down spending.)

At some point we are told, foreigners will get tired to buying US assets. And I agree, that is true. But it could be a lot longer than most of those with a bearish mindset think. We have $44 trillion (or so) in assets in the US. This total asset base grows every year by several times more than the trade deficit. So while the trade deficit as a percentage of GDP is staggeringly high, as a percentage of assets it is modest.

This game will go on as long as Asia decides to take our dollars. It is pretty much that simple. There are simply too many dollars and yen and yuan and baht and pesos and euro, and too few opportunities. That money has to find a home. And, for better or worse, the current home of choice is the US.

So, going back to a previous point, China needs stability while it works through some very serious problems. That means they need the US consumer to continue to buy products so they can provide jobs and slowly build their own consumer society and their won opportunities. To be able to take advantage of their internal opportunities they need sophisticated capital markets and banking institutions. They are years away from that. To have a consumer society, that means they have to increase the incomes and find jobs for hundreds of millions of people. To get sophisticated financial institutions, you have to train a generation of managers. It takes time. You don't do that by getting off the treadmill they are on.

The same goes for Korea, Thailand and the rest of developing Asia. We saw Malaysia drop its dollar peg within 24 hours of China. They, too, will have a basket. Eventually, I believe most, if not all, of Asia (including Australia and New Zealand) will create their own de facto currency basket and probably a currency unit of some kind based on that basket, as well as a free trade market. But that is eventually.

In the meantime, and until time's fullness, things will go on as they are because the governments of Asia, by and large, cannot afford to do anything else. What government is going to deliberately slow down growth in their country when it would mean so much personal short term loss? By personal loss, I am not referring to the citizens of the respective countries, though there would certainly be that. I am referring to the loss of the positions held by the politicians. Politicians hate losing power. It is a universal truth that they will avoid causing problems for which they can be blamed, if they can help it.

The hope of each of these governments and central banks is that if they go slowly enough their own country will build its own consumer engine and they can wean themselves off their dependency upon the US consumer who pays in electronic dollars. They hope to grow their own economies to the point that investment dollars stay in their own country rather than looking for safety and growth in the US.

In the meantime, and in a deflationary world, those dollars are not yet bad things. They can buy real stuff like bonds and GE and Microsoft.

Think about this. Last year Steve Jobs and Apple were responsible for $1 billion or so of our US trade deficit. Yet he grew the net assets in the country by $20 billion. Will that value hold in a recession? No, but is Apple a valuable franchise that will be around for a long time? Yes. And at some price below today's price, I would be a buyer of Apple.

Or mortgage backed bonds. Or oil companies. Or real estate. Foreigners take those dollars because not only does it keep their economy going, but they can buy something that is generally acknowledged as being of some value with them. And at $44 trillion and growing, there is a lot of stuff they can buy.

I think it was Business Week where an article in 1955 first decried the profligate American consumer. Each decade it gets worse. Consumer debt is now higher than ever, especially in terms of percentage of disposable income.

Is this a sustainable trend? Of course not, but it can go on longer than we think. As a national policy should it? No, as one day when it reverses it will cause us some very decided economic grief. But no individual thinks of national policy when he borrows more money. He thinks of cash flow and whether he can afford the payments for pleasure today.

In short, the move to revalue by the Chinese changed nothing, except maybe takes off some protectionist pressure. Good trade for them. Clever the way they did it. But since they have decided that "to get rich is glorious" and started down the yellow brick road of capitalism, they have been fairly clever at most points.

And it does start the process. So that is something. It was Mao who said the journey of a thousand miles starts with a step. This was a small one, but it was a step.

And I leave you with one final staggering statistic and thoughts from Hunt:

"Thus, China's economic future will be based on two foundations. The first will be to increase the share of consumption as a percentage of GDP, hence the focus of policy on the rural sector. The second will be to accelerate the growth of the private sector, which means, also, to encourage banks to lend more to this sector. As an integral part of this program, government intends to privatize as many as 170,000 state companies, at prices, which could be as much as 20% below book value.

"Despite the negative undertone of the issues I have raised today, I am encouraged by the growing willingness of China's leaders to discuss these very issues openly and the healthy variety of opinions one can find amongst government advisors. They will see China through this transition period to a market economy.

"Future growth, which will probably average around 7-8% a year over the next ten years, will be a much better mix between activity, education, social welfare, and the environment with the rural sector being the cornerstone. China is going through interesting times, but that is nothing new, not least in the last 25 years, but more especially throughout its long history."

Think about that. 170,000 companies privatized at below book value and unleashed to compete. My bet will be that most will fail. But then 80% of companies that are started in the US fail within 5 years. Failure is the sign of a healthy competitive process, for the 20% that make it drive an economy.

How do you get rid of excess capacity? Most of it is in government companies. So you privatize them and let them sink or swim. Slowly. Carefully.

The world will rebalance. It will be a bumpy ride, but we will get there. I am more convinced than ever that Muddle Through is going to be the order of the decade.

Paris, London and Ouzilly

This Sunday afternoon I leave with seven kids and a daughter-in-law for Paris for a few days, then down to friend Bill Bonner's chateau in Ouzilly (and Elizabeth and their six kids and even more relatives) for four days and then off to London. Off course, kid is a relative term in my family, as six are over 20 and the other two are 16 and 11. Bill's family is in that range as well. It should be a really fun time. I see a huge Texas BBQ in Bill's back yard.

I am personally looking forward to London, as I have been there many times but have never done the tourist thing. I will take a few meetings, but on the whole this is actually vacation, and I need it. This should be one the family remembers for a long, long time.

There will be a guest essay next week, and then if jet lag has not gotten to me, I will return to write the next weekend.

As many of you know, I have an office physically in the Ballpark in Arlington. Tonight, the Texas Rangers are playing the Oakland A's. Writing a letter during a game can be a bit of a distraction, especially a high scoring game as there is a lot of fan noise. Pitching contests tend to be quieter and I can get more done. Looking out the window, it looks like my Rangers are going to lose again. It is 8-6 in the 8th inning. Oops, make that 9-6. I don't think I am going to have to plan for play-off parties in October. As I do a final read, it is now 11-8. They are throwing batting practice. Rats, it ends 11-10 with the runner thrown out at home. We wuz robbed.

Enjoy your summer. I see museums, some great books and lots of family and friends in my near future, and maybe a few bottles of wine. And Bill has this wicked local moonshine. It will cure what ails you. Can it get any better?

Your on the road again analyst,


John Mauldin
John@frontlinethoughts.com
Copyright 2005 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

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Yuan only one factor in rates

Yuan only one factor in rates
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Yuan only one factor in rates
- Kathleen Pender
Sunday, July 24, 2005


Will China's move to loosen its currency's link to the dollar be the pin that pricks the U.S. bond bubble -- and perhaps the housing bubble along with it?

That depends on whether you think China's announcement on Thursday that it would no longer maintain a fixed exchange rate between its currency -- called the yuan, or renminbi -- and the dollar was a symbolic gesture or the start of something big.

On Thursday, the markets were convinced China was taking a big first step toward a free-floating currency, which would require it to buy fewer U.S. Treasuries. That would probably lead to higher U.S. interest rates. In anticipation of such a trend, the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond leaped 0. 12 percentage point to 4.28 percent.

On Friday, investor sentiment shifted. Rather than a major shift in policy, traders decided the revaluation was probably a political move designed to head off protectionist sentiment in Congress and make Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Washington in September more pleasant. The yield on the 10- year Treasury bond lost half of Thursday's climb, falling to 4.22 percent.

The reality: Chinese intervention in the currency markets is only one of many factors that affect U.S. interest rates. In isolation, China's decision probably would lead to higher rates. How high would depend on how quickly it moves toward a free-floating currency and whether other Asian countries let their currencies appreciate along with the yuan.

"The Chinese are going to tie the yuan a little bit less to the dollar," says Jim Grant, editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer. "They will be acquiring fewer dollars with which to manipulate or control their exchange rates. They will be investing less in U.S. Treasuries. All things being the same, and they never are, this could be a bad thing for U.S. bond prices and could tend to push interest rates higher."

China had maintained the dollar peg for 11 years. To do so, it had to buy or sell U.S. Treasury securities to offset changes in market supply and demand.

In recent years, America's growing appetite for cheap Chinese-made goods created a huge demand for yuan. To prevent the yuan from rising against the dollar, China bought large amounts of U.S. Treasury securities.

At the end of May, Chinese investors (including the government and private entities) owned $234 billion in U.S. Treasuries, up from $165.8 billion in May 2004 and a measly $81.3 million in May 2002.

China's Treasury purchases have helped keep a lid on U.S. interest rates. Low rates have encouraged Americans to borrow money to buy even more Chinese electronics, appliances, textiles and other goods.

If the yuan had been freely floating, this trade imbalance would have raised the value of the yuan relative to the dollar. That would have made Chinese imports more expensive and cooled Americans' ardor for them.

Pegging its currency to the dollar gave China an advantage over Asian countries that have more freely floating currencies.

The growing U.S. trade deficit with Japan, for example, has caused the yen to appreciate against the dollar (although that changed course this year).

Although Japan does not maintain a fixed exchange rate, it has been buying Treasuries to compete against the Chinese and hold down the value of the yen.

In May, Japanese investors held $685.7 billion in U.S. Treasuries, more than 2.5 times as much as China, which is the second-largest foreign holder of Treasuries.

"Japan is China's big competitor. Now that the Chinese have revalued the yuan, it gives the Japanese some breathing room," says Jim Bianco, president of Bianco research. Japan's Treasury purchases "won't go to zero, but the growth rate will go down."

Other Asian countries are likely to follow suit. After China's announcement, Malaysia said it, too, would no longer peg its currency, the ringgit, to the U.S. dollar. If every Asian country slows its Treasury purchases by a little, the effect could begin to add up.

Bianco says China gave out too little information to predict exactly how its move will affect the dollar and U.S. interest rates.

In a statement laced with oxymora, the People's Bank of China said it hopes to improve "the socialist market economic system" in China by moving toward a "managed floating exchange rate regime."

It will tie the yuan to an undisclosed basket of currencies. Each day it will announce the closing price of the yuan against various currencies, including the dollar.

It set the starting rate for the U.S. currency at 8.11 yuan per dollar, 2. 1 percent higher than its previous, long-standing rate. That's a small move, considering some U.S. manufacturers say the yuan is undervalued by 30 to 40 percent.

Each day, the dollar can float 0.3 percentage points higher or lower than the previous day's closing price. However, it appears that at the end of the day, the Chinese central bank can set the closing price wherever it wants, says Andrew Foster, director of research with Matthews International Capital Management.

"It's like keeping a bird on a string. The bird can fly wherever it wants on the string. The person holding the string can walk wherever they want. You may walk to where the bird landed and start from there or walk somewhere else, " says Foster.

"By keeping the basket of currencies a mystery, they have the flexibility to outline a central parity rate that may not be where the market put it the previous day," he says.

Foster called China's move "an irreversible step forward toward the eventual convertibility of the currency. Having a truly market-driven exchange rate is some time off. But the train has left the station."

Others see it as politically motivated. To protect U.S. manufacturers against inexpensive imports, certain members of Congress wanted to slap stiff tariffs on Chinese goods unless Beijing let the yuan rise.

"It was much more of political move," says Jim Cusser, a fixed-income manager with Waddell & Reed. "All the politicians were patting themselves on the back, acting like this was the Berlin Wall coming down. It's just not so. It's such an extremely small move."

No matter what happens with the yuan, Cusser says, foreign buyers will continue to scoop up Treasuries because they are generally safer and higher yielding than other countries' debt.

Ten-year U.S. Treasuries are yielding about one percentage point more than comparable bonds from France, Germany, Spain and Holland, and about three percentage points more than Japanese debt, he says. And at a time when other central banks are cutting rates, the Federal Reserve plans to take rates higher.

"We have the most transparent markets in the world," Cusser says. "If I had extra savings and I was a global investor, it's hard to pass up the depth and breadth of the U.S. markets."

Mark Kiesel, an executive vice president with Pimco, says China and Japan have little incentive to let their currencies rise because it would hurt their export sectors.

One reason China might want a more flexible exchange rate policy is to be able to fight inflation if it becomes a problem in its roaring economy. Chinese output grew at a 9.5 percent rate in the first half of this year. But, so far, inflation has been low in China, thanks to strong productivity growth.

Even if China and Japan did let their currencies rise, U.S. interest rates would not necessarily rise because our economy is still soft, Kiesel says. And if the Fed continues raising short-term rates, it will further weaken the economy.

He says Americans have become so mired in debt that even a small rise in long-term rates could slow the economy dramatically.

"Consumers are getting much more fragile in terms of their ability to spend," he says.

"If China revalued (its currency) and U.S. inflation was picking up and the economy was booming, we would have a different view," Kiesel says.

Edmund Harriss, manager of the Guinness Atkinson China and Hong Kong fund, was in Shanghai last week. He says the yuan move was bigger news in the United States than it was in China.

"I belive this is a precursor to further currency moves," he says, but China will be reluctant to move quickly, in part because Chinese companies don't have the hedging instruments that companies in more-developed countries have to protect themselves from currency swings.

"Within two years, I would expect to see the yuan about 10 percent higher, " Harriss says. "But it's not a clear path on how fast it's going to get there.

Net Worth runs Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. E-mail Kathleen Pender at kpender@sfchronicle.com.

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